



UNAIDS PCB BUREAU MEETING

DATE: Wednesday, 16 September 2026 and Thursday, 17 September 2026

TIME: 13:00–15:00 (CEST)

VENUE: Hybrid (in person at UNAIDS building and virtually on Zoom)

PARTICIPANTS

Netherlands: Representing the PCB Chair: Ambassador Ms Erica Schouten, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations; Ms Zina Olshanska, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Geneva; Ms Carolien van Embden Andres, Senior Policy Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mr Fabian Schipper, Senior Policy Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Philippines: Representing the PCB Vice-Chair: Dr Patrisha F. Quema, Medical Officer; Mr Jeffrey Valdez, First Secretary, Philippine Mission in Geneva.

Kenya: Representing the PCB Rapporteur: Dr Douglas Bosire, Chief Executive Officer, National Syndemic Diseases Control Council, Ministry of Health;

Representing the PCB NGO Delegation: Ms Amanita Calderon-Cifuentes, HIV Research and Advocacy Officer, Trans Europe & Central Asia (TGEU).

UNDP: Representing the Committee of Cosponsoring Organizations: Ms Mandeep Dhaliwal, Director of the HIV and Health Group, UNDP; Ms Karin Santi, Regional Team Leader HIV, Health and Development, UNDP.

UNAIDS Secretariat: Mr Mahesh Mahalingam, Chief of Staff; Mr Morten Ussing, Director of Governance; Ms Samia Lounnas, Senior Governance Advisor; Ms Adriana Hewson, Governance Officer; Mr. Luca Kaupp, Governance Officer; Ms Saliha Ozdemir, Governance Assistant; Ms Maya Salama; Governance Consultant.

Co-Facilitators (representing the PCB Working Group): Fionnuala Murphy, Joe Phaahla, Bob Rae.

PCB Working Group support: Lea Sofia-Simonsen, LEAD consultant; Mike Isbell, independent report writer.

MEETING AGENDA

1. **Review of the detailed options on the further transition and integration of UNAIDS into the UN system and beyond:** *The Bureau will discuss and agree on the consensus*

feedback on the detailed options to be submitted to the PCB Working Group.

- 2. Preparations for the multistakeholder consultation on 28–29 September:** *The Bureau will discuss the preparations for the multistakeholder consultation in line with the PCB decisions at the 58th PCB meeting.*
- 3. Discussion with the Co-Facilitators on the detailed options on the further transition and integration of UNAIDS into the UN system and beyond:** *The Bureau will present its feedback on the detailed options to the Co-Facilitators of the PCB Working Group.*
- 4. Any other business**

Summary of the Meeting (16 September)

The Chair welcomed Bureau members and recalled that the purpose of this pre-meeting of the Bureau was to prepare the subsequent meeting of the Bureau (17 September) with the Co-Facilitators and have a consensus review of the detailed options paper submitted by the Co-Facilitators on behalf of the PCB Working Group on the further transition and integration of UNAIDS into the UN system and beyond.

1. Review of the detailed options on the further transition and integration of UNAIDS into the UN system and beyond

The Chair recalled decision 10.4 from the 58th PCB, which requested the Working Group to share the detailed options through the PCB Bureau ahead of the next multistakeholder consultation, as well as decision 7.6 from the 57th PCB. In line with these decisions, the Working Group had shared the options paper with the Bureau on 10 September. Bureau members had subsequently consulted informally with their constituencies and provided feedback using a template assessing the options against the Terms of Reference, the guidance provided by the 58th PCB and the Working Group's interim report (Annex 1).

The Chair noted that the purpose of the Bureau's discussion was to identify areas of convergence and agree on consolidated feedback to be presented to the Co-Facilitators of the PCB Working Group on 17 September. The Chair also noted that the multistakeholder consultation on 28–29 September responds to the request of the PCB in decision 10.4 and thus would provide an official opportunity for PCB members, observers and other stakeholders to provide substantive feedback on the revised options which would support the Working Group to finalize the plan before its submission to the Special Session of the PCB for consideration on 26 October.

Bureau members reviewed the overall presentation of the detailed options, followed by the four deliverables and the specific questions set out in the assessment template. Members considered the options paper a positive starting point, while noting that it did not yet provide sufficient clarity on the proposed transformation under each option or the distinctions between the options. The Bureau noted broad support for the proposed UN-based hub and the vision for UN unified approach, while emphasizing the need for greater clarity on how the proposed arrangements under each option would translate into meaningful changes in functions, roles and ways of working across the Joint Programme.

The Bureau emphasized the need for greater clarity on the “how” the proposed arrangements would be institutionalized, including the roles of civil society, Cosponsors and the Secretariat. Bureau members stressed the importance of meaningful community leadership and its integration into governance structures at different levels, supported by clear mechanisms and adequate resources. The Bureau also emphasized the need to safeguard HIV-specific capacity and expertise, including in human rights and gender, during and after the transition

Bureau members noted that, while the paper sets out the broad principles for the division of labour, further clarity was needed on how functions would be distributed across the hub among JP actors on all levels: global, country and regional. The Bureau emphasized that the division of labour should extend beyond a distinction between coordination and implementation, and should clarify the key transformation in the decision-making process among JP actors when it comes to their respective functions, roles, authority and resources allocated.

The Bureau identified a need for clearer criteria and rationale for differentiated country and regional arrangements, including the added value of such presence under each option. Bureau members highlighted the importance of considering country and epidemic context, existing structures, civil society and human rights, while avoiding fragmentation, redundancy and leveraging existing structures. The Bureau also emphasized the importance of drawing on assessments of Cosponsor capacities to inform the potential allocation and transfer of functions, taking into account that some capacities may be still evolving. Members noted that the costing and budget implications of the different options remained insufficiently clear and stressed the importance of a responsible, function-led approach to determining future structures and arrangements.

The Bureau further noted concerns regarding the use of “participating agencies”, given potential inconsistencies with terminology already agreed within the ECOSOC framework. The Chair noted that the Bureau did not support the proposed new formulation and preferred to maintain agreed terminology.

Bureau members also discussed the proposal for a Special Envoy alongside an Executive Director. Members raised concerns regarding the added value and delineation of the proposed role, including its relationship with the Executive Director and PCB, as well as the potential implications for the structure and budget. The Bureau did not have a consensus on this issue as some members of the Bureau felt that it was not discussed with their respective constituencies. However, three regional groups previously consulted by the Chair did not support the proposal.

The Bureau highlighted concerns regarding the budget proposal made in the current Options Paper, noting that the proposed budget figures do not sufficiently reflect the ongoing decline in UNAIDS’ financial resources over the recent years. To ensure the sustainability of the whole exercise, the members stressed the critical need for a realistic core budget ceiling.

The Bureau agreed to convey consolidated consensus feedback to the Co-Facilitators, emphasizing the need for further clarity on how the transformation takes place under each option; how the division of labour, roles, responsibilities, authority and accountability across levels and actors look like; what are the necessary capacity requirements for preserving HIV response; how to strengthen community participation throughout governance structures on country, regional and global levels; provide clear costing options in line with the reduced but realistic and sustainable

budget and the appropriate funding model , and elaborate clear proposal for the transition pathway breaking it into the key milestones. The Bureau stressed that further development of the options should clarify the “how” and the functions required, with these informing the future structure and presence, scope and budget. The Chair would present the consolidated feedback to the Co-Facilitators at the Bureau’s meeting on 17 September.

2. Preparations for the multistakeholder consultation on 28–29 September 2026

The Chair introduced the discussion on preparations for the multistakeholder consultation scheduled for 28–29 September, noting that the consultation would provide an opportunity for PCB members, observers and other stakeholders to provide substantive feedback on the revised options paper and inform the PCB Working Group’s work towards the October Special Session.

The Chair presented the draft agenda for the consultation and noted that it would be finalized and shared with Bureau members as soon as possible. The Chair proposed that LEAD, the consultancy supporting the PCB Working Group, provide technical and preparatory support for the multistakeholder consultation, including support for an inclusive, question-based format and the organization of breakout sessions. It was noted that the PCB Working Group would need to agree to LEAD’s involvement in facilitating the consultation, following which the Secretariat would engage with the consultancy on preparations.

Bureau members discussed the proposed approach to structuring the consultation around a limited number of focused guiding questions linked to the issues arising from the Working Group’s discussions and unresolved issues reflected upon by the Bureau. Members emphasized that the questions should be concise and targeted at key areas of stakeholder divergence. Rather than inviting general statements, the goal is to drive substantive discussion and narrow the gaps between constituencies. The Chair noted that the consultation should not seek to replicate the Bureau’s discussion of the ten questions but should focus on a smaller number of key questions, informed by the revised options paper and the areas which are still unresolved.

The Bureau also discussed the proposed use of breakout sessions to facilitate more substantive engagement. Members noted the importance of ensuring that the consultation format did not restrict stakeholders’ ability to raise issues beyond the proposed questions.

The Chair noted that the guiding questions and instructions for the consultation would be shared in advance and that the aim should be to facilitate an inclusive and substantive discussion while avoiding an overly open-ended format.

The Bureau agreed that the multistakeholder consultation should be structured around a limited number of focused guiding questions linked to the revised options paper, with sufficient space for substantive stakeholder input. The Chair and Secretariat would take forward the preparation of the guiding questions and instructions, including consideration of support for the organization of the consultation.

Summary of the Meeting (17 September)

3. Discussion with the Co-Facilitators on the detailed options of the PCB Working Group on the further transition and integration of UNAIDS into the UN system and beyond

The Bureau meeting with the Co-Facilitators was held on Thursday, 17 September, based on the pre-meeting of the Bureau held on 16 September. The Chair welcomed the Co-Facilitators of the PCB Working Group and thanked them and the consultants for their work in developing the detailed options paper. The Chair recalled that the Bureau had reviewed the paper against the Terms of Reference of the PCB Working Group and the guidance provided by the 58th PCB meeting, following informal consultations with all PCB constituencies.

The Chair presented the Bureau's consolidated feedback to the Co-Facilitators. The Bureau considered the options paper a positive step towards articulating a concrete vision and informing the multistakeholder consultation, and recognized its potential to advance the transformation.

The Bureau identified several critical areas requiring further development to clarify how the transformation would be achieved under the proposed options and to enable clearer differentiation between the options beyond their institutional arrangements. In particular, the Bureau emphasized the need for:

- A clear division of labour and tasks among Joint Programme entities under each option at country, regional and global levels, including the respective responsibilities and accountability of actors;
- Consideration of the potential transformation of leadership, coordination and accountability at global and country levels, rather than framing the division of labour solely in terms of coordinating and implementing roles;
- Inclusion of civil society capacity and roles within this assessment, including consideration of how civil society could be strengthened and supported to assume greater responsibilities at both country and global levels;
- A capacity assessment of Joint Programme actors to identify existing strengths and plan for evolving capacities, particularly to ensure that the transfer of functions takes place responsibly and in line with country needs; and
- Costing of all options to allow PCB stakeholders to assess them against the criterion of financial sustainability including against the realistic and reduced budget. The Bureau highlighted the need to refine the proposed US\$60–85 million budget to align with the current climate of declining donor support. It emphasized that a streamlined and reduced core budget, supported by a transparent funding allocation model, is essential to securing long-term and sustainable financial stability.

The Chair also noted that the Bureau had not reached consensus on the proposal to appoint a Special Envoy, as some constituencies were still to be consulted. The Chair noted that three regional groups consulted to date were not in favor of the proposal, citing concerns that an additional senior position could create an overly top-heavy structure.

The Bureau acknowledged the short timeframe for further revisions but emphasized the importance of addressing these issues ahead of the multistakeholder consultation, noting that they had also emerged from consultations with PCB constituencies. Addressing them proactively would help ensure a more focused consultation.

The Co-Facilitators welcomed the Bureau's feedback and acknowledged that further clarity was needed on several areas, including the division of labour and roles of different actors, the balance between the focus on the hub and the functions of other Joint Programme actors, and the country and regional arrangements considered under some options. They also welcomed further discussion on how community leadership and civil society could be reflected and strengthened in the proposed arrangements, and indicated that some additional detail could be incorporated into the paper.

At the same time, the Co-Facilitators noted that some of the Bureau's requests would be difficult to address fully within the available timeframe and resources. They emphasized that the options paper was intended to set out a direction of travel and a process for transition, rather than a fully developed implementation plan, and that further detail on the division of labour, capacities and country-level arrangements would require information and input from Cosponsor agencies and other actors. They questioned the feasibility of undertaking a comprehensive capacity assessment at this stage, particularly in relation to civil society.

On the budget and pace of transition, the Co-Facilitators stressed that the budget should follow function and that a responsible transition could require higher initial resources, including human resource costs, before stabilizing at a lower level. They cautioned that more rapid reductions in country and regional support could risk undermining the response and emphasized that the pace of transition would need to be considered alongside the functions to be maintained and the resources available. The Co-Facilitators suggested that the financing discussion could distinguish between likely donor commitments, the resources required for a responsible transition and any resulting financing gap, including potential contributions from Member States.

Regarding the Special Envoy, the Co-Facilitators clarified that the proposal was not considered essential and had been intended to distinguish the Executive Director's change-management role from a broader political role. They noted that any such appointment would ultimately be a matter for the Secretary-General.

Bureau members provided further reflections on the options paper and, where relevant, shared additional inputs arising from informal consultations with their respective PCB constituencies stressing once again the importance of making transformation more visible throughout these three options and addressing the financial sustainability under each option including the differentiation of financial needs for the transition and after-transition periods.

The Rapporteur emphasized that the capacity and readiness of Cosponsors to assume functions should be assessed, including at country level, and stressed that transformation should ultimately support the progressive embedding of functions within national systems and strengthen country-led and country-funded responses, with communities remaining central.

The Rapporteur noted that the HIV Leadership Forum¹ had identified capacity assessment of Cosponsors as a prerequisite for the transfer of functions.

The Vice-Chair sought greater clarity on which elements of the proposed transformation could be implemented within the existing ECOSOC framework, and which would require further action by ECOSOC, noting the importance of this distinction for the PCB's consideration of the final proposal.

Reporting on consultations with Asia-Pacific constituencies, the Vice-Chair noted that the proposed Special Envoy had not been specifically addressed in those consultations. Further consultation would therefore be required before a constituency position could be provided on the proposal.

The NGO Delegation emphasized the need to institutionalize and operationalize the role of civil society and communities in the future arrangements, including through community-led monitoring and research, policy and advocacy, social contracting and other mechanisms that would enable meaningful responsibilities at different levels.

Drawing on engagement with its constituencies, the NGO Delegation emphasized the importance of focusing on practical mechanisms for community participation and leadership across the Joint Programme, rather than focusing primarily on changes to formal governance or voting arrangements.

The CCO Chair emphasized that the transformation should safeguard and strategically deploy capacity built across the Joint Programme, countries and civil society, rather than amount to downsizing driven primarily by declining funding. They supported assessing and validating available capacity across the Secretariat, Cosponsors, civil society, the wider UN system and countries, even though assuming that such exercise may take place after the decision on the option is taken, and called for greater clarity on how country-level capacity could be structured, including through the Resident Coordinator's Office or Cosponsors, while ensuring meaningful engagement of civil society and communities.

Reporting on consultations with the Cosponsors, the CCO Chair emphasized their position that the process should constitute transformation and integration, rather than downsizing driven by reduced funding.

In regard to the questions and positions expressed by some Bureau members, the Secretariat explained that the PCB Working Group had received legal advice on which aspects of the proposed arrangements could be addressed within the existing ECOSOC framework, and which would require further consideration by ECOSOC. To support the PCB's understanding, the

¹ The HIV Leadership Forum is a community of practice for Director Generals of National AIDS Coordinating Agencies.

Secretariat proposed a brief legal briefing during the PCB pre-meeting for the Special Session on 26 October.

The Chair noted that the discussion on capacity reflected a tension between determining the direction of travel first and having sufficient detail to enable stakeholders to make an informed choice between the proposed options. The Chair emphasized the need for further information on how the different arrangements could operate at country level and the capacity available to support them, while recognizing that this information could not be provided by the Co-Facilitators alone. The Chair suggested that the Cosponsors and Secretariat could work together to provide additional information in parallel, with a view to supporting a focused and informed discussion at the multistakeholder consultation.

In response to the further interventions from Bureau members, the Co-Facilitators clarified that the status quo was not considered an option and that the intended direction was towards greater national ownership, including a stronger role for civil society and communities, with technical implementation increasingly undertaken by Cosponsors and other actors. They indicated that the paper could be strengthened to better articulate the transformative elements, division of labour and country and regional arrangements, and that indicative examples could potentially be included. They also emphasized that a more differentiated and hybrid approach to country presence might be necessary, specifically when it comes to the differentiation between transition and post-transition period.

The Chair thanked the Co-Facilitators for the constructive exchange and reiterated that the options paper provided a strong basis for advancing the transformation. The Chair emphasized that further granularity would help PCB members make an informed decision and offered the Bureau's support in obtaining any additional information required. The Chair also welcomed the possibility of including indicative examples to illustrate how the proposed arrangements could operate at different levels. The Chair also stressed the importance of addressing the main objective of the Working Group's exercise as formulated in the ToR: develop a final plan for UNAIDS transition and integration into UN system and beyond, whereby the focus should be on strengthening 'one' UN team and the role of the civil society, reducing risk of fragmentation.

The Bureau expressed the hope that the feedback provided during the discussion would be considered, as appropriate, in the revised options paper in preparation for the multistakeholder consultation on 28–29 September.

4. Any other business (AOB)

Preparations for the multistakeholder consultation on 28–29 September

The Chair noted that the objective of the multistakeholder consultation would be to narrow areas of divergence, identify areas where consensus could be built and support the finalization of the report ahead of the October PCB Special Session. As the last opportunity for broader consultation before the PCB, the consultation should focus on obtaining stakeholders' views on the proposed direction of travel, rather than reopening the options in their entirety. The Chair noted that key guiding

questions would be developed to focus the discussion, with further granularity to be addressed as the process progressed towards implementation.

The Co-Facilitators expressed support for the consultants supporting the PCB Working Group (LEAD and report writer) to provide technical and preparatory support for the multistakeholder consultation, including support for the facilitation and organization of breakout sessions, subject to the availability of funding. The Secretariat indicated that it would explore the available options, including the possibility of additional funding, before confirming the arrangements for facilitating the consultation.

The Chair clarified that the revised options paper, rather than the final plan, would be shared with participants on 23 September ahead of the multistakeholder consultation.

The Bureau would revert to the Co-Facilitators on the proposed approach to the multistakeholder consultation, including the guiding questions and possible technical support, and looked forward to receiving the revised options paper the following week.

The Chair thanked the Bureau members for their time and closed the meeting.

[Annexes follow]

Annex 1: Table of Bureau feedback on options paper

Question	Netherlands	Philippines	Kenya	NGO delegation	CCO Chair
Overall comments on the proposed option	Highly appreciative of all the hard work of the Working Group. Good that the WG has indicated on which items it reached consensus, and for which items there is still divergence. Overall, some constituency members have further questions on what is essentially different from status quo, highlighting that maintaining status quo is unrealistic and unsustainable. Delegating implementation to co-sponsors is a positive step.	The Philippines supports further exploration of the UN hub (central entity) model, consistent with the direction emerging from PCB58. The future arrangement should, however, be guided by the principle that integration must not result in a loss of the multisectoral, rights-based and community-centred strengths that have characterized the Joint Programme. The transition should preserve clear global leadership and coordination for the HIV response, while ensuring that functions are placed where they can be delivered most effectively, sustainably and accountability. Particular attention should be given to the needs of low- and middle-income countries and countries with persistent or emerging	Kenya appreciates the hub direction on the condition that it is function-led, not structure-led. The hub is to retain all core functions intact and interconnected, carry genuine authority to align Cosponsors, preserve the ECOSOC mandate, and establish collective accountability across all actors. Country-defined criteria are to determine which structural option best meets these requirements. We also request a clear explanation and justification on the proposed role of the proposed special envoy.	Overall, we welcome the direction of the paper, particularly its commitment to preserve UNAIDS, the PCB and the Joint Programme's core functions, and its stronger recognition of community leadership. Our central concern is whether these commitments will be operationalised. The transformed model should institutionalise and finance co-creation, co-leadership and co-implementation with communities across global, regional and country levels, while preserving the independence of community-led organisations.	Cosponsors support further integration and transformation of the Joint Programme around a lean UN hub. However, the options require greater operational detail to demonstrate genuine transformation rather than the replication of the current model at a smaller scale. The final model should embed HIV responsibilities within agencies' mandates, workplans, budgets and accountability systems; recognise the Joint Programme as collectively owned; and draw on Cosponsors' technical, normative, advocacy, convening and implementation leadership. The Hub should focus on functions that genuinely require system-wide stewardship, coordination, political

		HIV vulnerabilities, where reductions in international technical and financial support may have significant implications for national responses. Meaningful participation of communities and civil society should likewise be preserved, while ensuring that modalities of engagement remain responsive to country contexts and complementary to national HIV priorities, policies and systems.			advocacy, accountability and consolidation. Functions, authority, capacity, accountability and resources should maintain critical interdependencies but do not necessarily require colocation. It is important to note that the core functions, as in the past, will not be managed by the hub alone – and clarity around the sharing of responsibilities with Cosponsors will be important. This recognition will also help signpost a potential roadmap for continuation should the proposed new model struggle to attract donor support. The model should preserve HIV-specific expertise and visibility, political leadership, gender equality, human rights and meaningful community participation, while aligning with UN80, the evolving global health architecture and country-led approaches. The paper appears biased towards the Secretariat and might
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					better acknowledge the role and contributions of Cosponsors over the years including in their contributions to the core functions.
1. What are the principal considerations associated with the proposed Direction of a UN hub (central entity)?	The Netherlands and our constituency members believe that the hub as presented in the options paper seems to be too close to the status quo. It depends partly on the options chosen, but currently there is insufficient transformative change. This may be due to that fact that detailed information on the division of labour on the global level (central coordination structure) and country level will need further elaboration based on the chosen direction. There is definitely a request for more consideration of options regarding the administrative arrangement (i.e. a hosted partnership model, or under a different UN entity	The principal consideration should be how to achieve greater institutional efficiency without diluting the unique value of the UNAIDS Joint Programme. The UN hub should retain sufficient authority, technical capacity and convening power to provide coherent global leadership, strategic coordination, accountability, policy coherence and advocacy across the UN system. The model should also preserve meaningful participation of Member States, communities and civil society. Integration should not simply mean administrative absorption or further downsizing. The proposed arrangement should demonstrate how fragmentation will be avoided, how accountability across the UN system will be maintained, and how	1. The hub is to retain all core functions intact and interconnected — political mobilisation, coordination, normative leadership, combination prevention, data and surveillance and community engagement. Fragmenting these functions across the hub, Cosponsors and successor entities would undermine their interdependent value. 2. The hub requires genuine authority to align Cosponsors and partners behind national plans. A coordinating mandate without specified authority does not resolve the fragmentation that countries have consistently identified as the dominant operational failure of the current model. 3. The ECOSOC governance mandate of UNAIDS — including formal civil society participation — is to be	The NGO Delegation supports the proposed UN Hub, provided that its size and resourcing are determined by the functions it must perform rather than by a predetermined staffing ceiling. The Hub must retain sufficient capacity for political leadership and advocacy, coordination and governance, data and accountability, and community leadership, with protected capacity for meaningful community engagement. A leaner Hub must not mean weaker HIV-specific leadership, visibility or accountability. Community co-leadership should be institutionalised across the Hub's functions, with formal roles, decision rights and adequate resourcing. For example, community-led monitoring (CLM) should not simply generate data that communities submit to the UN; the Hub must retain the capacity to integrate community-generated evidence into its	The main consideration is whether the proposed model will deliver genuine integration and transformation, rather than preserve a smaller version of the existing architecture. A lean, function-led Hub should complement and draw on Cosponsors' comparative advantages, while the Joint Programme remains based on collective leadership, co-ownership and shared accountability and aligned with the evolving global health architecture and broader priorities, including universal health coverage (UHC), primary health care and health-system strengthening, while preserving HIV expertise, visibility and accountability. The model should safeguard specialist HIV capacity and accountability, including explicit leadership for

	such as UNOPS). Some MS form our constituencies wonder whether the proposed options sufficiently reflect the driving force (transformative change) of UN80.	country-level support will remain responsive to differentiated national contexts.	preserved without dilution. This mandate is the basis of the hub's political legitimacy and its connection to Member State commitments and global targets. 4. The hosting arrangement for the hub must preserve the hub's operational autonomy and not make it subservient to a Cosponsor. 5. The hub is to carry a collective accountability mandate — holding donors, Cosponsors and implementing partners accountable for whether their investments support service delivery and align with national plans, not only tracking country performance against targets. 6. We propose the cosponsors be renamed to implementing agencies to reflect their functional role rather than participating agencies.	accountability systems, require follow-up where CLM identifies gaps, and provide a clear route for unresolved issues to be escalated. As responsibilities shift to Participating Agencies, the Hub must retain sufficient authority to coordinate the Joint Programme and hold actors accountable for agreed responsibilities.	gender equality, human rights, data and community engagement. Hosting options should be assessed transparently against integration, effectiveness, cost, governance and accountability. There are differing Cosponsor views on replacing the term “Cosponsors” with “Participating Agencies.” UNFPA supports the change if it reflects substantive co-ownership and leadership, while WHO cautions that it may have implications under the founding ECOSOC resolution and potentially diminishes the role and contributions of Cosponsors. Any change in terminology should therefore be legally and operationally defined and assessed before adoption.
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2. What crucial overall information is still missing in relation to the proposed options under the preferred Direction of one UN-hub (central entity)? What should definitely be addressed (and at which level of detail) before these options are presented at the multistakeholder consultation?	First, we would like to see more detailed information on the division of labour under each option. The division of labour among the secretariat, cosponsors and civil society is the driver of this transformation within the ECOSOC mandate. However, it is not clear, for example, what is the difference between the division of labour under option A (where technical implementation is done by the cosponsors) and option B (where the 54 UNAIDS countries are proposed to be preserved) on both global and country levels. It is important to make it more clear how the review of the division of labour makes any of this option more transformative than just splitting the roles in the same way between the secretariat,	The options would benefit from more concrete information on the institutional design and operational implications of each option, including: (1) which core functions will remain within the hub and which will be transferred to Cosponsors or other entities; (2) proposed staffing and technical capacity of the hub; (3) reporting and accountability lines; (4) implications for country and regional presence; (5) mechanisms for community and civil society participation; (6) indicative transition and recurrent costs; (7) funding assumptions and potential funding gaps; (8) legal and administrative implications; and (9) risks and mitigation measures. It would also be useful to present a comparative assessment of the options against agreed criteria, including effectiveness, sustainability, equity, country-level impact, accountability, cost, and risk of fragmentation.	1. Criteria for the hub host selection; 2. Cosponsor capacity assessments at country level; 3. Regional architecture options; 4. Evidence-based specification of which entity holds country-level coordination authority and with what mandate.	Before the multistakeholder consultation, the options need substantially greater operational clarity. Stakeholders need to understand what the Hub will retain, what will transfer to Participating Agencies, and how accountability will work when delivery fails. This requires a function-led assessment of the Hub's minimum staffing, expertise and resources—not an arbitrary staffing ceiling—as well as clear responsibilities, reporting requirements, service standards, escalation pathways and corrective-action mechanisms for Participating Agencies. The Hub must retain sufficient capacity for its essential functions, including political leadership and advocacy, community-led advocacy and mobilisation where appropriate, coordination and governance, data and accountability, and community leadership. Community leadership should not be confined to a single function: the paper should specify how co-creation, co-leadership and co-implementation will operate across the Hub, including where community	Before the multistakeholder consultation and finalisation of the recommendations, the report should include: - A detailed function and responsibility map specifying what will be retained, transferred, transformed, absorbed or discontinued; where each function will sit; and the responsible and contributing entities. - A clearer understanding or distinction between a Cosponsoring agency serving as the institutional host of the Hub and an operations or administrative host providing services such as finance, human resources and procurement could be useful. These are different functions and should be clearly separated in the options presented. - A legal and governance map clarifying which decisions fall within the authority of the PCB, ECOSOC, the
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	cosponsors and civil society. Second, there is a desire to have more information regarding the funding model and costing. The Netherlands and three constituencies consulted feel that the budget of 60-80 Million is too high and not realistic, especially in the long run, potentially endangering the sustainability of the response. Without a fully-costed model, it is difficult to make well-informed decisions and mobilize donor support. Third, without a final decision on country presence and a budget, there is no concrete proposal for transition that can be adopted and implemented.	The analysis should also clarify how community and civil society participation will be maintained within the different institutional configurations and how these arrangements can be adapted to diverse national contexts.		decision rights sit; how representatives are selected and accountable; how regional and key-population representation is ensured; and how community expertise, advocacy, mobilisation, CLM and community-led research are sustainably financed and remunerated. Community-generated evidence should have a formal route into Joint Programme accountability, including triggering review, corrective action and escalation. Greater detail is also needed on country and regional architecture: the mandate, authority, expertise and dedicated resources of country HIV coordinators; safeguards for communities in restrictive or criminalising environments; accessible and sufficiently independent community mechanisms at country level; and resourced regional capacity directly connected to community and key-population networks. Countries without Hub presence must not lose accessible routes for community engagement, advocacy, rights-related responses or accountability.	Secretary-General, Cosponsor governing bodies and any host institution. - Costed scenarios covering the Hub, transferred Cosponsor responsibilities, country and regional coordination, community-led work, administrative costs, transition costs and liabilities. - A costed milestone-based transition roadmap setting out sequencing, responsibilities, dependencies, readiness criteria, financing requirements and the intended end-state. - A clearer assessment of Hub-hosting options against integration, cost, effectiveness, legal, fiduciary and governance considerations. - Evidence of direct institutional engagement with Cosponsor Principals where recommendations
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				Finally, the financing architecture needs greater specificity on pooled-fund governance and community decision-making; direct, flexible and accessible financing for community-led organisations, including smaller organisations and social contracting; protected financing for community leadership based on transparent costing; and continuity during wider HIV financing transitions. Integration with other health responses must be defined so that it strengthens rather than dilutes dedicated HIV expertise, financing, data, differentiated services, political visibility and community-led delivery. Not every operational detail needs to be finalised before the consultation, but these are core design parameters, not implementation details. Stakeholders need sufficient specificity to assess whether the proposed model can genuinely preserve UNAIDS' essential functions, community leadership and accountability beyond 2030.	would change agencies' functions, accountabilities or resource requirements. The multistakeholder consultation should inform unresolved choices and should not be treated as endorsing options that have not yet been fully costed, legally assessed or operationalised.
Deliverable 1: A plan to preserve the multisectoral HIV capacity and expertise of the Joint Programme and the UNAIDS Secretariat's core functions					

3. How do the proposed options sufficiently address the capacity question with regard to the effective delivery of core functions? (Please refer to all proposed options)	The report makes a clear choice to keep the core functions clustered at the hub. What capacity would be needed to effectively deliver the core functions? The Netherlands and its constituency members converge that at country level, staff from cosponsors (in RCO) should take the lead, instead of maintaining a central country presence. The added value of dedicated 'hub' offices (along with the required staff capacity) is insufficiently clear.	The Philippines emphasizes that the preservation of functions should take precedence over the preservation of institutional structures. The final model should clearly identify the minimum critical capacities that must remain available collectively, regardless of where individual functions are ultimately located. These should include global HIV stewardship and coordination; strategic and policy coherence; epidemiological and programmatic data and accountability; technical support to countries; human rights and gender equality; and support for community-led responses. The hub should retain a critical mass of multidisciplinary expertise sufficient to perform these functions and to coordinate the Cosponsors effectively. A model that is structurally lean but lacks the technical capacity to fulfil these functions would risk creating greater fragmentation and	The capacity question has not yet been sufficiently addressed in the draft Report. The Working Group has focused primarily on institutional structure rather than on demonstrating how each option delivers the functions required for country-level impact. Kenya identifies six functions requiring capacity confirmation in any option: political mobilisation, coordination of the global response, normative leadership and global strategy, combination prevention through multisectoral delivery, data and surveillance as a public good, and community engagement. For coordination specifically, the capacity question requires specification of which entity holds authority to align Cosponsors, what the consequences of non-alignment are, and how the coordination burden on national government teams is reduced. This specification is absent	The proposed options recognise that the Hub should be function-led, but they do not yet sufficiently demonstrate that the proposed capacity will be adequate to deliver those functions effectively. The NGO Delegation therefore cautions against determining the size of the Hub, including the proposed 35–40 staff model, before establishing the minimum expertise, staffing and resources required for each retained function. Capacity should be assessed not only for coordination, but for political leadership and advocacy, data and accountability, and community leadership, including community-led advocacy and mobilisation where appropriate. Community expertise should be embedded across these functions. This includes sufficient capacity to institutionalise and resource co-creation, co-leadership and co-implementation; integrate community-led monitoring and research into accountability systems; and maintain meaningful relationships with community-led organisations and networks. Capacity must also be	A smaller Hub could be viable if it has a tightly defined remit and technical and implementation responsibilities are genuinely transferred to adequately mandated, staffed and funded Cosponsors. A larger Hub may provide additional resilience but risks duplicating Cosponsor functions and recreating a centralised structure. Staffing of the future Hub should be based on transparent, competency-based processes aligned to the agreed functions and skills required by the transformed model. The final report should quantify the skills and full-time capacity required across the Joint Programme, including at regional and country levels, and demonstrate that receiving agencies can absorb transferred responsibilities. Staff counts alone may not fully capture the extent to which restructured and resource-constrained. Cosponsors are able to
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		dependence on ad hoc arrangements.	from the current options. For political mobilisation, the capacity question requires confirmation that the hub retains the political independence and standing to engage heads of state, Finance Ministries, regional bodies and global partners on behalf of the HIV response. Absorption into a Cosponsor or general UN development platform would compromise this capacity.	assessed across the Joint Programme as a whole. Transferring technical and implementation responsibilities to Participating Agencies is viable only where they have demonstrated expertise, human-rights competence, community trust and adequate resources, alongside clear accountability for delivery. The final model should therefore establish the functional requirements first, assess where the necessary capacity currently exists or must be strengthened, and determine Hub and Participating Agency staffing and resources accordingly.	absorb additional functions. The size and composition of the Hub should follow the agreed function map.
4. Do the proposed options advance and embed community leadership and ensure meaningful participation of communities, including people living with HIV, key populations and civil society, in the HIV response, including in governance and decision-	Not sufficiently clear currently. Besides the intention to involve civil society more in the decision-making, the options do not elaborate clearly on the revision of the role and accountability of the civil society on global and country levels: can they do more than they do now, and will they receive funding? Can they sit at the table together with the cosponsors and	Yes. Meaningful and sustained participation of communities and civil society should remain a core design requirement of the future model. The governance arrangements should preserve the established role of communities, people living with HIV, key populations and civil society in decision-making, oversight and accountability. At the same time, such participation should be responsive to national and regional contexts	1.Community-led delivery — peer testing, adherence and retention — is a service delivery function, not only a governance representation question. The options require: funded, protected community delivery systems as permanent components; 2. The ECOSOC mandate should be preserved; 3. Specified role for National AIDS Authorities in sustaining	The proposed options move in the right direction by recognising community leadership as a core function, retaining NGO representation in the PCB, proposing community-designated roles and remuneration, and envisaging community participation in pooled-fund governance. However, recognition and participation are not sufficient unless they are translated into institutionalised power, resources and accountability. The transformed model	The proposals contain welcome commitments to community leadership, decision-making and remuneration, but these commitments are not yet sufficiently operational. The final model should provide: • Formal representation and decision rights at global, regional and country levels. • Transparent selection and

making? (Please refer to all proposed options)	the secretariat for decision-making process at the central level? Which option does offer this possibility? Potentially, their roles should be formalised at every level, and sufficiently reflected in both the revised division of labour as well as funding model (and co-ownership on allocation).	and aligned, where appropriate, with national HIV priorities, policies and programmes, while preserving the independence and legitimate role of civil society. The future model should recognize that the nature and modalities of community and civil society engagement may appropriately differ across countries, depending on the epidemiological context, legal and institutional environment, and maturity of national HIV responses. Participation should be adequately supported and resourced so that it is meaningful and sustained rather than limited to consultation. The Philippines recommends that the final proposal articulate minimum safeguards for meaningful community and civil society participation, including representation, access to information, participation in agenda-setting and decision-making, and appropriate support for engagement.	community space at country level. 4. The current options do not sufficiently address operationalisation for key populations in restricted environments.	should explicitly embed co-creation, co-leadership and co-implementation with people living with HIV, key populations and community-led organisations across governance, advocacy and political mobilisation, financing, data and research, service delivery, technical work, monitoring and accountability. This requires clearly defined community decision rights; transparent, constituency-led selection and accountability of representatives; adequate regional and population representation; remuneration and sustainable financing, including social contracting; and accessible funding for smaller community-led organisations. Community leadership must also extend beyond consultation. For example, communities should help determine research questions and indicators, generate and interpret evidence through community-led research and CLM, and have formal mechanisms through which that evidence can trigger institutional responses, corrective action and escalation. Similarly,	accountability arrangements. • Independent community-led monitoring. • Predictable, direct and safeguarded financing for community-led, women-led and key-population-led organisations. • Protection of community participation and voice in restrictive environments. • Grievance and escalation mechanisms. • Meaningful participation that is not dependent solely on joining UN-led consortia. Community participation should be embedded in both governance and implementation, with protected resources to support institutional capacity, programmes, evidence generation, monitoring and sustained engagement.
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		These safeguards should allow sufficient flexibility for country-specific modalities of engagement that are consistent with national contexts, priorities and systems, while ensuring that the voices of communities and civil society are not diminished in the future governance arrangement.		community representatives in pooled-fund governance should have genuine decision-making authority rather than an advisory role. The NGO Delegation should retain a formal and continuous governance and accountability role, including throughout the transition, while this should not substitute for direct participation of relevant community-led organisations and networks in population-specific, technical and programmatic processes. These safeguards should apply at global, regional and country levels, particularly where criminalisation, restricted civic space, migration status or other barriers make meaningful participation more difficult.	
5. Do the proposed options for the division of labour between the hub, eleven Cosponsors (six lead and five affiliate, as per the PCB decision ²) and civil society provide	The division of labour on the global, regional and country level would need a further elaboration. This particularly requires a decision about regional and country presence. Our constituency believes that cosponsors and civil society should take	Not clearly. The division of labour should be based on clear comparative advantage, complementarity and accountability, rather than simply allocating existing UNAIDS functions among entities. The final framework should specify who is responsible for each	Current options do not provide sufficient clarity. A credible division of labour requires: one entity with specified Cosponsor alignment authority; a published, enforceable division of lead responsibilities; consequences for non-alignment; and one coordinated UN offer at country level.	The proposed division of labour provides a useful direction, but it is not yet sufficiently clear, coherent or accountable to ensure that the Joint Programme remains genuinely joint rather than becoming fragmented across Participating Agencies. The model needs greater specificity on which functions remain with the	The proposals contain welcome commitments to community leadership, decision-making and remuneration, but these commitments are not yet sufficiently operational. The final model should provide: • Formal representation and

² https://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/2025-12/PCB57_Decisions_EN.pdf

sufficient clarity, coherence and accountability while avoiding fragmentation? (Please refer to all proposed options)	on a more prominent role at country level. Discussion within constituency about changing terminology (cosponsors vs participating agencies), as this would deviate from nomenclature originating from ECOSOC.	core function, who provides technical leadership, who coordinates, and who is ultimately accountable for results. The role of civil society should also be clearly defined within the broader architecture, recognizing its important contribution to community-led responses and accountability while ensuring that engagement is complementary to, and appropriately aligned with, national HIV strategies, priorities and systems. Particular attention should be given to functions that are inherently cross-sectoral and therefore cannot be effectively managed through isolated institutional mandates. The Philippines would support development of a function-by-function accountability matrix covering the hub, lead Cosponsors, affiliate Cosponsors and relevant community/civil society actors. This should identify the lead entity, supporting entities, expected	Cosponsor capacity assessments are a prerequisite for any function transfer.	Hub, which are transferred, how responsibilities are distributed among lead and affiliate Cosponsors, and how these actors work together at global, regional and country levels. This division of labour should also explicitly define how community-led responses are integrated and resourced across these functions and levels, with communities involved through co-creation, co-leadership and co-implementation rather than treated as a separate or consultative component of the architecture. Increased responsibility for Cosponsors must be matched by clear collective accountability. For each function, the model should establish named responsibilities, expected standards and results, reporting requirements, and mechanisms for corrective action and escalation when commitments are not fulfilled. The Hub must retain sufficient authority and capacity to coordinate across agencies, identify gaps and duplication, and safeguard the coherence and multisectoral character of the Joint Programme. Communities and civil	decision rights at global, regional and country levels. • Transparent selection and accountability arrangements. • Independent community-led monitoring. • Predictable, direct and safeguarded financing for community-led, women-led and key-population-led organisations. • Protection of community participation and voice in restrictive environments. • Grievance and escalation mechanisms. • Meaningful participation that is not dependent solely on joining UN-led consortia. • Community participation should be embedded in both governance and implementation, with protected resources to support institutional capacity, programmes, evidence generation, monitoring and sustained engagement.
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		outputs, accountability mechanism and financing responsibility. The framework should also clarify how civil society and community-led actors will interface with national programmes and the UN system, with sufficient flexibility to reflect country-specific contexts and priorities. Such clarity would help prevent duplication, gaps and parallel structures during and after transition.		society are also essential to preventing fragmentation. Formal and resourced mechanisms should connect the Hub, Cosponsors and community-led organisations across policy and programme design, advocacy and mobilisation, research and data, implementation, community-led monitoring and accountability. Social contracting and other accessible financing mechanisms should enable community-led organisations to perform these functions professionally, parallelly and independently. Without this architecture, transferring functions risks dispersing HIV expertise, accountability and community engagement across agencies rather than preserving an integrated and genuinely joint response.	
6. Do the proposed options provide an effective mechanism for differentiated country and regional support, taking into consideration the issue of capacity of downsized	First, there is still no sufficient information on the capacity needed from different actors under each option presented. Second, it is not clear which instrument these options offer for differentiating country and regional approaches without sufficient insight into	Not very clearly. Country and regional support should be differentiated according to epidemiological context, vulnerability, capacity and the degree of external support required, rather than applying a uniform model across countries. The future arrangement should maintain mechanisms for timely	1. Differentiation criteria and application mechanisms are not yet specified. 2. National AIDS Authorities are the existing country entities with statutory authority to anchor coordination and community engagement as UNAIDS presence contracts.	The proposed options do not yet sufficiently demonstrate that the required capacity will exist after downsizing. Differentiation should consider not only epidemiological burden, but also civic space, punitive or discriminatory laws, human-rights conditions, access for key populations, migration and mobility, financing transitions, and the strength of national and community	No, at present further work is required. Cosponsors support differentiated and country-led arrangements based on national context, epidemiology, institutional capacity, human-rights conditions, financing, community needs and partner presence.

secretariat, co-sponsors, civil society and the national entities? (Please refer to all proposed options)	the division of labour and the presence of different actors on the ground, and the impact on the budget of maintaining such presence. Generally, our constituency would like to see more transfer of tasks to cosponsors at country level. For regional support, we question cost-effectiveness of proposed option, vs other alternatives.	technical assistance, policy advice, data and surveillance support, capacity strengthening and coordination with national programmes. Particular attention should be given to countries with limited national and institutional capacity and to settings where the HIV response is vulnerable to reductions in external assistance. Support to community and civil society actors should likewise be responsive to national circumstances and aligned with national HIV priorities and systems, while preserving meaningful community leadership and participation. Regional expertise and networks should also be retained where they provide efficiencies and enable countries to address shared challenges. The Philippines recommends that the transition plan include a clear country-support framework, identifying how countries will access technical expertise after	3. The HIV Leadership Forum for Africa, Latin America and Asia provides an existing peer accountability mechanism for differentiated regional support. 4. Regional architecture — Africa CDC, regional economic communities — requires dedicated consideration in the final plan.	systems. At country level, there should be a clearly identified HIV coordinator with defined authority, expertise, dedicated time and resources to convene Participating Agencies and maintain accountability. This should be complemented by a formally constituted and resourced community mechanism connecting people living with HIV and key populations with the coordinator, Participating Agencies, national structures and the Hub. Its institutional location can vary by context, but it must remain accessible and sufficiently independent to raise concerns, particularly where communities are criminalised or excluded from national responses. Regional capacity is equally important and should not be treated as secondary to country presence. Resourced regional functions, directly connected with regional community and key-population networks, are particularly important where civic space is restricted, populations are highly mobile, epidemics cross borders, or individual country structures cannot adequately represent	The preferred direction should be to deliver functions through Cosponsors, UN country teams and national institutions where they have adequate capacity, using hybrid arrangements where continuity, political access, trusted community relationships or specialist capacity would otherwise be at risk. No country or regional function should be withdrawn until a mandated and accountable recipient has been identified and the necessary staffing, financing and operational arrangements are in place. Regional capacity should be explicitly defined, with existing Cosponsor regional structures considered as potential hosts rather than automatically creating separate Hub structures. Regional functions could also be delivered through virtual regional "desks" rather than traditional regional offices.
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		downsizing, including when expertise is located in Cosponsors or other entities. Country support should not become dependent solely on countries' ability to navigate multiple UN entities independently. A sufficiently empowered hub should be able to facilitate coordinated support where countries require multisectoral assistance. The framework should also recognize that modalities of engagement with civil society and communities should be adapted to country context and national priorities rather than applied uniformly across settings.		marginalised communities. Finally, withdrawal of Secretariat presence should be based on functional readiness, not simply the availability of another UN entity. Before functions are transferred, there should be evidence that Cosponsors, national entities and community-led organisations have the mandate, expertise, resources and accountability mechanisms required to assume them. Countries without Hub presence must retain accessible routes for community engagement, community-led advocacy and monitoring, rights-related responses and escalation to the Joint Programme.	
7. To what extent do the proposed options optimize and transform the division of labour on global and country levels, particularly regarding core functions? (Please refer to all proposed options)	The option that offers the possibility for transforming the division of labor is the option A as it offers the delegation of the leadership role of the CCOs and civil society on the country level whereby pursuing more 'one' UN HUB idea. However, this option should	The Philippines supports optimization of the division of labour where this results in greater coherence, efficiency and country impact, but cautions against optimization being equated with further fragmentation or loss of institutional memory. The transformation should distinguish between	Optimisation at country level requires: a specified convenor with Cosponsor authority; a published division of lead responsibilities; and a collective accountability mechanism tracking all actors. The test is whether the option reduces the coordination burden on implementing countries	The proposed model has the potential to significantly improve the division of labour by concentrating the Hub on core functions while placing greater technical and implementation responsibility with Participating Agencies. Its effectiveness, however, will depend on whether this becomes a genuinely coordinated redistribution of functions rather than simply	In order to appropriately optimize and transform the division of labour the following actions are proposed: - Transfer, integrate or discontinue duplicative Secretariat functions. - Secure formal agency endorsement of revised responsibilities. - Attach predictable financing to every

	elaborate more clearly on the difference in the division of roles among key stakeholders on the global level. It is not clear, for example, whether the central coordination structure has a different decision-making process and roles divided among key stakeholders. Otherwise, it is not clear what is the difference with the current role of the secretariat.	functions that can be decentralized or transferred and functions that require a dedicated cross-UN coordinating capacity. At country level, the model should reduce duplication and transaction costs for national programmes rather than requiring countries to coordinate separately with multiple entities. The division of labour should also ensure that engagement with communities and civil society remains meaningful and appropriately connected to national HIV responses and priorities.	and delivers one coherent UN offer behind national plans. An option that preserves individual core functions while leaving country teams managing fragmented Cosponsor engagement has not optimised the division of labour — it has redistributed it.	a transfer of responsibilities from a downsized Secretariat to Cosponsors. At global level, the Hub should retain sufficient authority and capacity for political leadership and advocacy, coordination and governance, data and accountability, and community leadership. At country level, responsibilities should be differentiated according to context and assigned only where Participating Agencies and national entities have the mandate, expertise, resources, human-rights competence and community trust required to deliver them. Importantly, community leadership should not be treated as one discrete core function. Community-led organisations should be resourced to co-create, co-lead and co-implement relevant work across the division of labour—from advocacy, strategy and priority-setting to research, data, services, community-led monitoring and accountability. Optimisation should therefore clarify not only what the Hub and Cosponsors do, but how community-led responses are structurally integrated	transferred responsibility. - Use country-requested configurations and apply the principle of subsidiarity. - Build on UN country teams without assuming that Resident Coordinator offices can absorb specialist HIV coordination. - Establish mutual accountability across the Hub, Cosponsors and communities. - Direct a greater share of resources towards country-level delivery, Cosponsor technical capacity and community leadership. The final approach should demonstrate the practical redistribution of functions, authority and resources rather than rely primarily on changes in terminology or institutional labels.
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				across their respective functions at global, regional and country levels. Ultimately, transformation requires clear responsibilities, standards, reporting, collective accountability and escalation mechanisms, with the Hub retaining sufficient capacity to identify gaps, address non-delivery and preserve the coherence and multisectoral character of the Joint Programme.	
Deliverable 2: An UN-mandated governance model that preserves the role of communities and civil society and ensures the continued coordination, accountability and leadership of the global HIV response					
8. Does the proposal provide for coherent and actionable institutional and governance arrangements that uphold and advance the core mandate of UNAIDS as established by ECOSOC?	Yes, the UN HUB provides for institutional and governance arrangement that uphold ECOSOC mandate. We see a risk of opening ECOSOC mandate, and therefore agree to keep the ECOSOC mandate.	The future governance model should provide clear authority, accountability and decision-making arrangements for the continued UN leadership and coordination of the global HIV response. The institutional arrangement should preserve the multisectoral character of the Joint Programme and the established role of Member States, communities and civil society. At the country level, the engagement of communities and civil	Coherent governance requires: 1. ECOSOC mandate for the joint programme and civil society participation preserved; 2. Collective accountability mechanism holding all actors — not only countries — to global targets; 3. Defined Country agency mechanisms within the governance structure, including mechanisms for implementing countries	The UN Hub can provide a coherent institutional and governance framework that preserves UNAIDS' ECOSOC mandate, particularly by retaining the PCB, the multisectoral character of the Joint Programme, and formal civil society participation. However, these arrangements need to be more actionable in defining how authority, responsibility and accountability will operate across the Hub, Participating Agencies, communities and country and regional structures.	Cosponsors appreciate the risks in opening ECOSOC and are unified in wanting to preserve the role and status of communities. More analysis is required to understand what other governance modalities can support meaningful change. Retention of the ECOSOC mandate and the PCB would provide continuity and preserve the formal participation of communities and civil society. However, the proposed governance arrangements are not

		society should be meaningful, context-responsive and complementary to national HIV responses, taking into account national priorities, policies and systems. The relationship between the hub, Cosponsors and the governing body should be explicit, including respective mandates, reporting lines, performance accountability and mechanisms for resolving gaps or overlaps. The final proposal should also demonstrate how the institutional arrangement will continue to deliver the core mandate established by ECOSOC rather than merely transferring functions administratively to another UN entity. The Philippines would particularly welcome clarity on where ultimate accountability for global HIV coordination will reside, how the governing body will exercise oversight, and	to set priorities for UN support and hold the implementors accountable for coherent delivery. 4. The hub is to be anchored within ECOSOC to sustain its political mobilisation function and Member State connection.	The PCB should remain the central governance and accountability body, while the Hub must retain sufficient authority to coordinate the Joint Programme and hold Participating Agencies accountable for agreed responsibilities. Increased authority for Participating Agencies should be matched by named responsibilities, reporting requirements, corrective-action mechanisms and clear routes for escalation to the Executive Director and, where necessary, the PCB. The transformed governance model should also advance, rather than simply preserve, UNAIDS' exceptional model of community participation. Retaining the five NGO seats is essential, but community voice without voting rights should not be presented as equivalent to decision-making power. The model should therefore define substantive community decision rights in areas such as priority-setting, financing, community-led functions, monitoring and accountability, while institutionalising co-creation	yet sufficiently actionable. The final report should: - Clarify the respective decision-making authority of the PCB, ECOSOC, Cosponsor governing bodies and any host institution. - Ground accountability in jointly agreed commitments, resources and governance arrangements. - Avoid implying that the Executive Director would supervise Cosponsors' constitutional mandates, staff or governing bodies. - Protect the collective ownership of the Joint Programme. - Clarify the purpose, mandate, cost, duration, reporting line and relationship of any Special Envoy with the Executive Director. - Consider a future review of whether community and
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		how the meaningful participation of communities and civil society will be maintained within the future governance structure. The governance model should also be sufficiently adaptable to respond to changes in the global HIV landscape without requiring repeated structural reforms. At the country level, it should provide sufficient flexibility for community and civil society engagement to reflect national contexts, priorities and institutional arrangements, while maintaining meaningful participation and accountability.		and co-leadership at global, regional and country levels. These elements are essential to ensure that transformation strengthens the distinctive multisectoral and community-led governance established under the ECOSOC mandate, rather than preserving its formal architecture while weakening its practical capacity and accountability.	Cosponsor participation, including voting arrangements, remains fit for purpose after implementation experience has been assessed. - Fundamental changes to functions, authority or governance should receive appropriate intergovernmental and agency-level consideration and approval
Deliverable 3: A funding model to sustain the proposed governance model structure and activities					
9. Is the funding model and its proposed options sufficiently credible and sustainable to support both the hub and complementary Cosponsor and	The proposed funding models are not credible and not realistic. 60-80 million is too high. It is important to propose a realistic funding scenario and costing for the options to be able to understand which	Sustainability should be assessed on the basis of the full cost of the future HIV coordination architecture, rather than the cost of the central hub alone. The funding model should account for the hub, complementary Cosponsor functions,	Funding model cannot be evaluated without costed scenarios — this is the most critical current gap. Financing floor covers: coordination mechanism; multisectoral prevention; community	The proposed funding model provides a useful basis, particularly through a single budget and workplan and a pooled financing mechanism, but its credibility and sustainability will depend on whether resources are matched to the functions the transformed Joint	The funding model is not yet sufficiently credible because the proposed resource levels are not supported by complete function-led costing, confirmed commitments or clear financing assumptions. The final report should present minimum,

civil society functions, including the costs of transition and ongoing operations?	and whether the functions are sufficiently funding, and whether the transformation process can take place. This is however a crucial element, so more information on this is much needed in the revised version in the preparation to the Multistakeholder consultation.	country and regional support, community and civil society participation, transition costs, information systems, change management and other necessary operational costs. There should be predictable and diversified financing, with appropriate safeguards against donor volatility and conditionality that could undermine continuity of essential functions. Financing arrangements should also recognize that meaningful community and civil society participation requires adequate and predictable resources. The Philippines recommends that the final report provide transparent cost estimates and financing assumptions for each proposed model, including transition and recurrent costs. It should also identify potential funding gaps and corresponding mitigation measures. Importantly, cost-efficiency should not be achieved by transferring	systems; data and surveillance; political mobilisation capacity. Three risks require treatment: transition financing guarantee; ring-fenced community financing; domestic resource mobilisation through sectoral budget integration. Ring-fenced financing should include community-led responses and key population services, while domestic resource mobilisation should include linkage of HIV programming to Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks.	Programme is expected to deliver. Costing should therefore be function-led and cover not only the Hub, but also the additional capacity required by Participating Agencies, community-led functions, country and regional arrangements, and the costs of transition itself. Community leadership must be treated as a costed and protected institutional function rather than dependent on residual or discretionary funding. The model should identify the resources required for community-designated roles, remuneration, community-led monitoring and research, advocacy and mobilisation, governance and technical participation, coordination, accessibility, mobility and safety. Based on this costing, a protected minimum funding floor for community functions should be established, with transparent financial reporting making these allocations visible and monitorable. The pooled mechanism should provide direct, flexible and accessible financing to community-led organisations, including smaller organisations that	central and higher-resource scenarios, together with adjustments that would be triggered by funding shortfalls. The budget should separately identify: - Hub operating costs. - Resources for transferred functions. - Country and regional support. - Community-led and women-led work. - Pooled catalytic financing. - Transition and human-resource liabilities. - Administration, oversight and accountability costs. Resources should follow functions. Predictable core funding is required for sensitive, normative and system-wide responsibilities, and non-core fundraising should not be treated as a substitute. Pooled funding should be transparently and jointly governed, with protected financing for community-led and
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		unfunded responsibilities to countries, communities or already resource-constrained national programmes. The financing model should ensure that responsibilities assigned to Cosponsors, civil society and community-led actors are matched with appropriate resources and accountability arrangements.		may not meet conventional UN implementing-partner requirements, and enable social contracting and multi-year funding where feasible. Communities should also have genuine decision-making authority in the governance and allocation of these resources. Finally, sustainability cannot be assessed only against the internal financing needs of the transformed Joint Programme. The model must account for the wider contraction and transition of external HIV financing, including risks to community infrastructure and continuity of services. Domestic financing should contribute according to capacity, while international solidarity and coordinated international financing remain essential to address gaps and protect the response where domestic resources are insufficient.	women-led organisations and safeguards for consistently underfunded priorities, including gender equality and human rights. Do not support reinstating country envelopes, these frequently divide limited resources into small allocations for fragmented or ad hoc activities. A pooled funding mechanism linked to pooled planning and agreed Joint Programme priorities would be preferable.
Deliverable 4: Timeline with milestones for transition and integration process					
10. Is the proposed transition pathway realistic and sufficiently phased to minimize	There is no clear proposal for transition. There was broad agreement to seize the momentum and not drag the process. It is	The transition should be phased, sequenced and evidence-based, with continuity of the HIV response as the overriding consideration. Functions should not be	Rejection of the 2026 sunseting deadline is endorsed. The WG October 2026 report requires a quarter-by-quarter roadmap for 2027 and year-by-year	The proposed transition pathway provides an important foundation through its phased approach and “do no harm” principle, but continuity should be determined by functional	A 2027 transition period may be reasonable, but the proposed pathway is not yet sufficiently actionable. The final report should set out firm milestones,

disruption and ensure continuity of the HIV response?	important to elaborate what exactly it means, how long this process would take based on the options presented. Generally, the Netherlands and constituency members believe that a quick transition phase would ultimately be better than a staged process.	transferred or discontinued until the receiving entity has the necessary mandate, resources, personnel, systems and technical capacity to assume them. The pathway should include clear milestones, decision points, risk monitoring and contingency measures. The transition should also allow sufficient time for consultation with Member States, Cosponsors, communities, civil society and affected personnel.	through 2030. Transition steps are to be gated by defined milestones and capacity thresholds, with implementing countries participating in threshold evaluation. The timeline is to account for the compounding of simultaneous transition demands on national government teams. The transition should be driven by demonstrated attainment of milestones rather than by an institutional calendar.	readiness rather than by the timeline alone. No function should be transferred or Secretariat presence withdrawn until the receiving entity has a clear mandate, sufficient expertise and resources, agreed standards and functioning accountability mechanisms. Readiness must also explicitly include community infrastructure. Before any transition, there should be functioning and adequately financed mechanisms for community participation, community-led monitoring and research, advocacy and mobilisation, and continuity of community-led services and support. Affected communities should have a formal role in assessing whether successor arrangements are accessible and operational, particularly in countries where key populations are criminalised, excluded or affected by reductions in external financing. The NGO Delegation should have a formal and continuous role through the PCB and Bureau in overseeing implementation and identifying systemic problems during the	sequencing, named responsibilities, financing requirements, dependencies, readiness criteria and the intended end-state, aligned with UN80 and broader global health reform. Cosponsors note with concern that transition has been taking place in the absence of a planning framework for more than a year. No further function or further country presence should be withdrawn until: - The receiving entity and its interest and ability to take on responsibilities are confirmed. - Country configurations, transition arrangements and responsibilities should be jointly designed by the Secretariat and Cosponsors - Accountability arrangements are agreed. - Staff and financing are in place. - Legal, data, human-resource and administrative
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				transition, complemented by direct participation of relevant community-led organisations in assessing constituency-specific functions. Finally, while completing the institutional transition by 2030 is reasonable, 2030 should not be treated as the endpoint of the coordinated HIV response. The transformed multisectoral and community-led architecture must be designed to remain effective beyond 2030 for as long as the epidemiological, political and human-rights realities require it.	arrangements are operational. - Service standards and escalation mechanisms have been established. - National authorities and affected communities have been consulted. - Regular PCB reporting should monitor implementation of the transition. Leadership arrangements should distinguish clearly between interim transition management and permanent leadership. There are differing views on the proposed Special Envoy. UNHCR supports the role if it strengthens oversight, accountability and adherence to transition milestones. WHO cautions that it may create an unnecessary additional layer unless its mandate, duration, costs and relationship with the Executive Director are clearly defined.
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**PCB Bureau Feedback – Options Paper by the PCB Working Group
on the further transition and integration of UNAIDS into the UN
system and beyond**

PCB Bureau Meeting 17.09.2026

**1. What are the principal considerations associated with the
proposed Direction of a UN hub (central entity)?**

- The report generally provides a good starting point but does not provide sufficient clarity on the transformation and the option presented. The Hub is presented in broad terms.
- Capacity for Human Rights and Gender should be safeguarded.
- Hosting options should be assessed and evaluated in relation to the option provided.
- More work should be done on understanding “how” things happen so that the Hub function becomes a transformation, and how the role of different actors would be embedded in the Hub.
- Concern regarding the use of new language which is not in line with ECOSOC, for instance regarding the Cosponsors.

2. What crucial overall information is still missing in relation to the proposed options under the preferred Direction of one UN-hub (central entity)? What should definitely be addressed (and at which level of detail) before these options are presented at the multistakeholder consultation?

- The division of labor and tasks between Joint Programme entities, at different levels (global, regional, national) needs clarity including responsibility and accountability between different levels and actors.
- Need for greater clarity on the functions under each option. Assessment of clarity of capacity definition. Importance of investing in evolving capacity and the period of time needed for this.
- Costing should be part of the paper, otherwise, it will be difficult to make decisions. Function before size or budget. The Working Group should focus on function before discussing anything. First need to decide on the “How” before the size and scope will be decided upon.

3. How do the proposed options sufficiently address the capacity question with regard to the effective delivery of core functions?

- No constituency considers the capacity question answered. Need for capacity assessment of different stakeholders across the core functions including the role of civil society and how civil society could contribute to the Joint Programme in general.
- Need for an understanding of the capacity required across the core functions and across the different levels (country, regional and global level)

4. Do the proposed options advance and embed community leadership and ensure meaningful participation of communities, including people living with HIV, key populations and civil society, in the HIV response, including in governance and decision-making?

- Importance of embedding civil society more in the elaborated options.
- Not clear on the operationalization of the community embedment in the options.
- Reinforcement of community engagement, however, the Working Group has to elaborate better on how to reinforce community engagement in the different options as well as in governance on all levels.
- Should be costed and visible in the governance framework how community participation can be strengthened.

5. Do the proposed options for the division of labour between the hub, eleven Cosponsors (six lead and five affiliate, as per the PCB decision) and civil society provide sufficient clarity, coherence and accountability while avoiding fragmentation?

- Need for a clear division of labor under each option, need for mapping of capacity of cosponsors as well as capacities of civil society.
- Need to understand the differences between cosponsors in the kind of capacity.
- Need to focus on the Joint Programme as a whole not the Hub (alone). Each option needs to show the transformation of the Jointness on different levels (governance, core functions).

6. Do the proposed options provide an effective mechanism for differentiated country and regional support, taking into consideration the issue of capacity of downsized secretariat, co-sponsors, civil society and the national entities?

- Information provided in the report does not provide sufficient clarity and criteria to define whether there is an effective mechanism for country and regional support.
- Need to clearly determine value added of the regional presence in relation to each option.
- More definite criteria on how the regional and country presence is identified to answer the question on the best mechanism.

7. To what extent do the proposed options optimize and transform the division of labour on global and country levels, particularly regarding core functions?

- This question has already been touched upon under the question on division of labour (Question 5).

8. Does the UN hub (central entity) provide for coherent and actionable institutional and governance arrangements that uphold and advance the core mandate of UNAIDS as established by ECOSOC?

- Reaffirm that all Bureau members support the ECOSOC mandate and not reopening, however, the Bureau reaffirms also the importance of elaborating the governance arrangement on different levels and decision-making authorities and language used (for instance on accountability/authority).

9. Is the funding model and its proposed options sufficiently credible and sustainable to support both the hub and complementary Cosponsor and civil society functions, including the costs of transition and ongoing operations?

- Need for options elaborated with clear division of labor, governance structure to define a budget.
- Budget proposal is not realistic.

10. Is the proposed transition pathway realistic and sufficiently phased to minimize disruption and ensure continuity of the HIV response?

- The constituencies unanimously see no sufficient transition pathway.
- Transition should be responsible and based on defined milestones and budget but within a foreseeable period without the risk of being prolonged too much.

Special Envoy and position of the Executive Director:

- No consensus decision at this moment and some PCB Bureau members have to consult their constituencies.
- No clear understanding of added value of the Special Envoy, concern among many constituencies it would make the Hub top heavy, also considering a reduced budget.
- Recommendation for reformulation of the Options Paper by the Working Groups to expect the appointment of a new EXD for the Joint Programme.

[End of document]