

# Evaluation of the UN system response to AIDS in 2016-2019

Summary slide deck



# Disclaimer

This evaluation has been authored by the Itad Evaluation Team.

Thanks are owed to the UNAIDS evaluation office, the Evaluation Management Group and the Evaluation Reference Group for their support and technical inputs throughout the evaluation.

The views expressed in this report are, however, those of the evaluators. They do not represent those of UNAIDS or of any of the individuals and organisations referred to in the report.

# Headline message

UNAIDS, the UN Joint Programme on AIDS, has long been held up as an exemplary expression of UN reform. The UBRAF is evidenced-based and proposes actions that are globally relevant to ending AIDS by 2030 in line with SDG targets. However, significant decreases in resource availability, has resulted in growing tensions between the Secretariat and UNAIDS Cosponsors.

These tensions are exacerbated as Cosponsors shed staff with HIV expertise and as decreases in core resources for Cosponsors compared to the Secretariat are combined with demanding requirements for reporting.

While a pragmatic approach to programme management and advocacy at country level shows the real advantages of a joint co-sponsored programme, the UBRAF itself offers little guidance as to how to set priorities when resources are constrained. Nor does it offer a means for understanding the specific contribution of the Joint Programme to national responses, or holding Cosponsors and the Secretariat accountable for their performance.


Our recommendations offer a way forward that has the potential to break what otherwise may become a continuing cycle of decline and establish new and more effective ways of working and demonstrating clear results.


# Purpose of the evaluation

To conduct a **structured review of the UBRAF** – UNAIDS Unified Budget, Results and Accountability Framework – and the **performance of the Joint Programme** at the global, regional and country levels.

To provide robust **evidence-based recommendations** to support learning and *forward-looking* planning, specifically the **development of UNAIDS' next Strategy/UBRAF** and the future **positioning of the Joint Programme**.

# Evaluation framework





**Right things**  
Assumptions around the way the UBRAF instrument is structured and designed

**Right ways**  
Assumptions around the way the Joint Programme is being operationalised

**Right results**  
Assumptions around the way the UBRAF, through the Joint Programme, is contributing to improved results

**1** UBRAF defines the right mix of actions for the JP at all levels

**2** UBRAF articulates how UN JP actions are both rights and needs-based for key stakeholders and gender sensitive

**3** UBRAF reflects UN system, Cosponsors' and Secretariat comparative advantage at all levels

**4** The JP enhances synergies between Cosponsors, Secretariat and partners' responses at all levels.

**5** The J P ensures greater and meaningful involvement of PLHIV and affected communities

**6** The JP mobilised, allocated and used financial and human resources in an efficient way at global, regional and country level.

**7** UBRAF allowed for better planning, monitoring and reporting to ensure course correction and better programming at all levels

**8** The Joint Programme has achieved UBRAF results

**9** UBRAF results contribute to the status and response to the HIV epidemic at national level

**10** UBRAF results can be sustained beyond 2021

# Data collection methods


**Portfolio analysis** consisting of a desk review and analytical summary of evaluations most pertinent to the evaluation focus areas.

**Key informant interviews and focus group discussions** with stakeholders at global, regional and country level.

**12 country case studies.**

**A web-based survey** with national, regional and country-level stakeholders.

# Evaluation in figures

600+ 

## Documents reviewed

- 101 Key background documents
- 89 Supporting background documents
- Over 330 supporting documents for country visits

469 

## Key informant interviews

- 26 Cosponsors
- 9 UNAIDS Secretariat
- 22 Externals
- 412 country KIIs

1 

## Web based survey

- 1,102 responses
- 358 U.N organisation
- 87 UNAIDS Secretariat
- 197 national / local government
- 180 national NGO or community based organisation
- 89 international NGO
- 91 Donor organisation / development partner
- 100 other

12 

## Country case studies

- Myanmar
- Ukraine
- South Africa
- Jamaica
- Iran
- Nigeria
- Papua New Guinea
- Kazakhstan
- Madagascar
- Guatemala
- Morocco
- Burkina Faso



# Findings

Headline findings statements are presented below under each of the 10 Hypotheses. Detailed explanations of these findings statements are provided in the full report. The strength of evidence against each finding statement is also provided.

Ranking	Strength of evidence
<b>1</b>	Evidence comprises multiple data sources (good triangulation), which are generally of decent quality. Where fewer data sources exist, the supporting evidence is more factual than subjective.
<b>2</b>	Evidence comprises multiple data sources (good triangulation) of lesser quality, or the finding is supported by fewer data sources (limited triangulation) of decent quality but that are perhaps more perception-based than factual.
<b>3</b>	Evidence comprises few data sources (limited triangulation) and is perception-based, or generally based on data sources that are viewed as being of lesser quality.

# Hypothesis 1:

UBRAF defines the right mix of actions for the UNAIDS Joint Programme globally, regionally and at country level

UBRAF defines the right mix of actions for the UNAIDS Joint Programme globally, regionally and at country level	Strength of evidence
1.1. The strategies and actions of the Joint Programme are largely evidence based, especially at global level.	
1.2. The UN Joint Programme response as articulated in the UBRAF and subsequent strategic shifts are considered extremely relevant, given the challenges to maintain momentum at global and country levels.	
1.3. The relevance and actions of country-level UN Joint Plans is mixed and will likely remain debated.	
1.4. UBRAF reflects the commitment of UNAIDS and Cosponsors to social determinants of HIV and to stakeholder participation.	
1.5. Strategic result areas and activities defined in the UBRAF are ambitious as they mirror the global strategy, and unlikely to be fully achieved; the UBRAF is thus not very realistic.	
1.6. The UBRAF provides little guidance to prioritise strategic result areas or activities.	
1.7. UBRAF does not serve as a resource allocation tool, as intended.	

## Hypothesis 2:

UBRAF articulates how the UN Joint Programme actions are both rights- and needs-based for key stakeholders (including key populations) and gender-sensitive

UBRAF articulates how the UN Joint Programme actions are both rights- and needs-based for key stakeholders (including key populations) and gender-sensitive	Strength of evidence
2.1. The process to identify Joint Programme priorities is very inclusive and participatory at global, regional and country level.	Green
2.2. The UNAIDS Strategy, UBRAF and country-level plans are responsive to the needs of governments and key populations.	Orange
2.3. UBRAF promotes the greater and meaningful involvement of people living with HIV, communities and civil society.	Green
2.4. The UNAIDS Strategy provides a comprehensive rationale for interventions that address gender equality and women empowerment (GEWE). However, the lack of reference to a number of relevant global normative standards, along with consistent shortfalls in systematic gender analysis, constrains the Joint Programme from coordinating and prioritising sustainable gender-transformative HIV interventions.	Green

# Hypothesis 3:

UBRAF reflects UN system, Cosponsors' and Secretariat comparative advantage at global, regional and country level

UBRAF reflects UN system, Cosponsors' and Secretariat comparative advantage at global, regional and country level	Strength of evidence
3.1. The UN system comparative advantage, especially with respect to 'upstream work', is indicated but not elaborated in the UBRAF.	
3.2. Global stakeholders question the added value of the Joint Programme architecture beyond 2030.	
3.3. The comparative advantage of regional Joint UN Teams depends on willingness and ability of regional Cosponsor offices to collaborate.	
3.4. UBRAF recognises the Global Fund and the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) as funders of national responses, but not their technical support and normative role, and how this interacts with the UN system mandate at global or country level.	
3.5. Global Fund and PEPFAR involvement in Joint Programme planning is mostly indirect.	
3.6. The UNAIDS division of labour adequately reflects the roles and mandates of Cosponsors and Secretariat, but it is political and continuously debated.	
3.7. The role of the Secretariat vis-à-vis Cosponsors at all levels has been contentious and precarious from the early days of the Joint Programme. Incompatible demands from member states and NGOs and Cosponsors leave the Secretariat in a difficult position.	
3.8. UBRAF and the Joint Programme are in line with UN and SDG principles.	
3.9. The UNAIDS Joint Programme is considered to be an example of UN reform, and achieves UN reform objectives best at country level.	

# Hypothesis 4.

The Joint Programme enhances synergies between Cosponsors', Secretariat and partner responses at global, regional and country level

The Joint Programme enhances synergies between Cosponsors, Secretariat and partner responses at global, regional and country level	Strength of evidence
4.1. Many external stakeholders at the country level did not know what UBRAF as an acronym meant nor its purpose.	
4.2. Overall, the Joint Programme appears to be adequately interacting with its external partners with some noting specific helpful initiatives and others noting that there is still room for improvement. Most respondents did not specify whether this cooperation differed between the global/HQ, regional, and country levels.	
4.3. The relationships and level of collaboration across the Joint Programme are under stress at the global level.	
4.4. Collaboration of the Joint Programme at country level both internally and externally is reported to be generally working well.	
4.5. While Joint Programme informants reported good knowledge of the UBRAF and how it had responded to the overall UN objectives, many flagged that the prominence of HIV within some UNDAFs/UNSDCFs has decreased.	

# Hypothesis 5:

The Joint Programme ensures greater and meaningful involvement of people living with, at risk of and affected by HIV in the AIDS response

The Joint Programme ensures greater and meaningful involvement of people living with, at risk of and affected by HIV in the AIDS response	Strength of evidence
5.1. The UNAIDS 2016–2021 strategy notes that strong civil society engagement is critical to implementation and the overall governance structure ensures civil society engagement in global planning and decision making.	Green
5.2. At the global level there is an intensive effort to engage with civil society networks to support global policy development, while at the country level, UNAIDS plays a critical role as a broker bringing together civil society and other sectors.	Green
5.3. There continues to be a degree of discontent among some stakeholders about the quality and level of CSO and community involvement – particularly at the country level.	Yellow
5.4. UNAIDS and UBRAF has replaced language on ‘greater and meaningful involvement of people infected and affected by AIDS’ (GIP/MIPA) with ‘greater involvement of civil society (and funding for civil society organisations), which reflects assumptions on representativeness and governance.	Green

# Hypothesis 6:

The Joint Programme has mobilised, allocated and used financial and human resources in an efficient way at global, regional and country level.

The Joint Programme has mobilised, allocated and used financial and human resources in an efficient way at global, regional and country level	Strength of evidence
6.1. Resource mobilisation for core funding has been less than anticipated and this has resulted in increased tensions at all levels across the Joint Programme.	Green
6.2. A key issue explaining the lack of success in raising funds for the Joint Programme appears to be the Joint Programme's inability to link funding with results, particularly at the global and regional level and, to a certain extent, at the country level, which has reduced confidence for partners to provide resources.	Green
6.3. A challenge raised by the vast majority of Cosponsor key informants is the perception that a disproportionate amount of core funding is allocated to the Secretariat in relation to the Cosponsors.	Green
6.4. There are mixed views on the adequacy in the way the Joint Programme has responded to the financial resource constraints though there is an emergent consensus that the realities of constrained resources represent an opportunity for the Joint Programme.	Yellow
6.5. Two of the main reported barriers to fully utilising the situation of constrained resources are (a) increased reporting and accountability demands on Cosponsors (even though funding has decreased) and (b) that the thinning of resources has left most programmes unable to demonstrate and communicate significant results, catalytic or otherwise.	Yellow
6.6. The increased country-level allocation (through country envelopes) has been broadly appreciated. However, there are a number of reported issues which need to be resolved to ensure more effective implementation of the funding.	Green
6.7. The allocation of human resources both in terms of quantity and quality is widely reported to be one of the weakest areas of the Joint Programme. This has weakened the implementation of Joint Plans, the Joint Programme's effectiveness, and has led to sub-optimal support for national strategies in some cases.	Green
6.8. Cosponsor HIV-specific human resources are reducing, and affecting Cosponsor capacity to provide technical leadership in their mandated field; UNAIDS Secretariat and UCO human resources are also reducing (but to a lesser extent).	Yellow

## Hypothesis 7:

UBRAF has allowed for better planning, monitoring and reporting to ensure course correction and better programming at global, regional and country level

UBRAF has allowed for better planning, monitoring and reporting to ensure course correction and better programming at global, regional and country level	Strength of evidence
7.1 While there has been recent good progress in streamlining and rationalising the UBRAF reporting system it is still widely considered to be sub-optimal.	Green
7.2 The UBRAF as an accountability framework fails to articulate the contribution of the UN system to country-level and global change.	Green
7.3 External evaluations are supposed to provide a more objective and independent assessment of the Joint Programme contributions, to be triangulated with UBRAF reporting, yet, until recently, there have been few evaluations done on Cosponsor or Secretariat HIV programmes.	Orange



# Hypothesis 8:

The Joint Programme has achieved UBRAF results.

The Joint Programme has achieved UBRAF results	Strength of evidence
<p>8.1. At the global level, in 2018 80% of the UBRAF indicator measurements met or exceeded the 2019 milestones set for these, an increase of 8% since 2016. This suggests that at a country level, considerable progress has been made in the AIDS response in those areas that the Joint Programme focuses on.</p>	
<p>8.2. In 2018, there were large differences between countries on an overall score based on responses to the indicator measurements, indicating substantial differences between countries in the status of their AIDS response. There are only small differences in progress in the response between Fast-Track and other countries, or regions.</p>	
<p>8.3. Some progress has also been made in terms of changes in the number of new HIV infections and AIDS-related deaths, although the Fast-Track targets that have been set for these impact indicators have not been achieved.</p>	

# Hypothesis 9:

UBRAF results contribute to the status and response to the HIV epidemic at national level

UBRAF results contribute to the status and response to the HIV epidemic at national level	Strength of evidence
9.1. The UN Joint Programme contributes to SDGs identified in the UBRAF, to the extent that it contributes to strategic result areas and country HIV responses.	
9.2. While it is difficult to prove the contribution of the Joint Programme to country-level outcomes using quantitative data (UBRAF indicators), based on qualitative data, there is ample anecdotal evidence of Joint Programme outputs that have contributed to changes in HIV responses at the country and global level in terms of normative guidance, policy options, tools, strategic information and resources in the period 2016–2019. However, the contribution of individual Cosponsors and the Secretariat cannot be established.	
9.3. The UN Joint Programme contributes to addressing social enablers at all levels, and this is mentioned to be ‘part and parcel’ of the Joint response.	
9.4. The UN Joint Programme contributes to resource mobilisation and supports transition from external to domestic funding.	
9.5. The UN Joint Programme contributes to stronger systems and capacities to sustain national and local AIDS responses.	


# Hypothesis 10:

UBRAF results can be sustained beyond 2021, including through sustainable financing for national responses.

UBRAF results can be sustained beyond 2021, including through sustainable financing for national responses	Strength of evidence
10.1. Sustainability of UBRAF output level results (change in countries) hinges on country capacities, willingness and resources – largely outside sphere of Joint Programme influence.	
10.2. Sustainability of results of Cosponsor HIV programming depends on core funding but also (mainly) on Cosponsor investment of own resources.	
10.3. Sustainability of the UNAIDS Secretariat programming and results depends largely on core funding resource mobilisation and donor commitment to UNAIDS.	
10.4. Sustainability of the UN Joint Programming depends largely on willingness to collaborate and contribute – less on mobilising core resources.	

# Validation of the evaluation hypotheses

The following diagram maps against the theory of change we developed for this evaluation the extent to which the evaluation team have concluded whether the 10 hypotheses have been validated or not.



# 11 Specific Evaluation Conclusions

Presented below are the 11 specific evaluation conclusions mapped against each of the three overarching evaluation questions.

These conclusions provide more detail and nuance to these three headline conclusions and cut across the hypotheses.

These 11 evaluation conclusions draw directly from the evaluation findings provided in the previous section.

# Right Things **Conclusions**



Right things

1

The UNAIDS Strategy, which articulates the global response, is highly relevant because it describes the UN system's 'upstream' role within the global response, and is based on evidence and extensive input from the key stakeholders.

2

The UBRAF, which provides operational details on the Joint UN response, is not well known beyond the Joint Programme. It is not used as was intended and has demonstrated limited value as a prioritisation / resource allocation tool. The UN system cannot and/or does not use it as such.

3

The lack of Joint UN 'HIV and gender' plan, based on agreed definitions and priorities prevents clarity on the way forward.

# Right Ways Conclusions



Right ways

4

Country-level Joint Planning contains positive lessons in particular for UN reform.

5

The UBRAF output indicators do not allow assessment of the UN system contribution to global progress nor do they adequately systematically capture the direct contribution that Joint Programme activities make to country-level change.

6

The recognised challenges of Joint Programming across multiple agencies have been significantly exacerbated by a shortage of available funding – but this is seen by many as an opportunity for strategic prioritisation.

7

The view that financial and human resources from core funds are not being appropriately allocated across the Joint Programme is widely held, particularly at global level.

8

At the country level, the ability to provide leadership in HIV technical areas, as well as programme and oversee HIV funds, has been negatively impacted by reductions of HIV positions for several Cosponsors. This will have short-, medium-, and long-term consequences for the Joint Programme.



# Right Results **Conclusions**



Right results

9

There is progress in terms of reaching UBRAF milestones although there is wide variability between country performance, and the expected acceleration in the country response in fast-track countries versus other countries has not clearly happened yet. There are numerous, mainly qualitative, examples of UN contributions to the global and country HIV response.

10

The sustainability of the results achieved through the Joint Programme to date are not guaranteed and indeed are under immediate threat.

11

Looking forward, a coordinated UN response on HIV remains very relevant, especially at normative and policy level; however, the future relevance of the Joint Programme architecture is being questioned by a number of key stakeholders (including key donors).

# Headline Evaluation Conclusions (part 1)

On the basis of the hypothesis-driven validation of the theory of change, the headline conclusions of this evaluation are as follows:

The **structure and design** of the UBRAF has been a success in several ways. It is needs based, inclusive and participatory and provides a comprehensive rationale for interventions that address gender equality and women's empowerment. But despite demonstrating the potential for UN reform at country level, it has proved unable to achieve a consistent division of labour among the Cosponsors and Secretariat and neither guides the prioritisation of actions nor is an effective tool to allocate resources.

In its **operationalisation** UNAIDS has been most successful at engaging with and bringing together civil society with other sectors. In contrast, while collaboration across the Joint Programme generally works well at country level, it is under stress at the global level, where Cosponsors are increasingly unable to provide technical skills and leadership. Mobilisation of resources and allocation across the programme is recognised to be weak with poor accountability and falling effectiveness. The contribution of the UN system to country and global change is poorly recognised and insufficiently evaluated.

# Headline Evaluation Conclusions (part 2)

The UBRAF has potential to play a continued useful role as an instrument for the Joint Programme. However, for this to be the case the UBRAF needs to have a fully articulated Theory of Change (ToC) which is fully aligned with a modified results framework that includes precise output level performance indicators which are attributable to the UN system.

Despite shortcomings in UNAIDS' operationalisation and measurement, evidence suggests a number of key UBRAF milestones for **results** were being met or exceeded in 2019, although with wide variation among countries. The Joint Programme clearly contributes to country level outcomes though the relative performances of the Cosponsors and Secretariat cannot be identified. The Joint Programme contributes to stronger systems and capacities to sustain national and local AIDS responses.

# Headline Evaluation Conclusions (part 3)

Looking forward, the **sustainability** of the results achieved through the Joint Programme will depend critically on a) continued core funding of UNAIDS, b) continued Cosponsor engagement and c) increased alignment with national priorities and associated domestic commitments. In the current environment, none of these things are guaranteed:

- Cosponsor HIV programming depends on continued core funding but also (mainly) on Cosponsor investment of own resources and there is no certainty that Cosponsors will continue to invest their own resources moving forward.
- The sustainability of the UNAIDS Secretariat programming and results depends largely on core funding, resource mobilisation, and donor commitment to UNAIDS which is likely to be under threat: Some donors question the continuing relevance of the Joint Programme architecture and it is not clear that donors will remain committed to UNAIDS beyond 2021.
- Finally, at national level domestic commitments to AIDS programming have, on the whole, been disappointing and there is little indication that this will shift positively.

# Recommendations

Eight recommendations have been identified based on the 11 conclusions. The recommendations are divided into strategic and operational recommendations.

The strategic recommendations are structured to address concerns over resource allocation, especially from core funds. They include a redefined UN system strategy; a fully costed and prioritised unified budget; improving the theory of change to identify effective indicators; a revision of the architecture of the Joint Programme; and revamped professional interaction.

The operational recommendations support strategic change and deal with mobilising resources more systematically; ways to improve allocation of core funds and to reassess human resources in the Secretariat and Cosponsors; and improved articulation for gender mainstreaming.

The recommendations are presented in the following slides as overall recommendation statements with specific detailed recommendations presented as bullet points underneath these statements. These bullet points are listed in order of importance/urgency and proposed sequence of timing.

# Recommendation 1:

**Strategic Recommendation** - The Joint Programme needs to prioritise programming in a more strategic and pragmatic way.


- UNAIDS Secretariat and Cosponsors to finalise the next Unified Budget, guiding specific allocation of joint human and financial resources, so that the budget:
  - prioritises core funds to joint strategies and activities (as opposed to Cosponsor specific);
  - fully costs each priority of the UN system strategy, showing funding gaps, so that donors appreciate what the Joint Programme can or cannot do based on levels of funding;
  - reduces the number of countries for country envelope funding such that the monies are large enough to make a difference and reduce the transaction costs;
  - prioritises the UNAIDS Secretariat geographical footprint (fewer country offices, more multi-country offices) deploying savings to increase the Fast-track/country envelopes.
- UNAIDS Secretariat to facilitate where possible (e.g. around country-level NSP development and global review processes) improved UN joint system planning with the Global Fund, PEPFAR and mutual donors.
- UNAIDS Secretariat to facilitate consensus among UNAIDS Cosponsors for the period until 2030, on a UN System Strategy in support of the global HIV response.
  - This UN System Strategy should be realistic:
    - based on scientific evidence of strategies having the most impact on the HIV epidemic;
    - based on cost-effective approaches;
    - tying into the agreed-upon Division of Labour and the upstream role of the UN system.
  - The UN System Strategy should be prioritised:
    - prioritising the geographical footprint for UN System support;
    - presenting specific UN activity areas as ‘investment cases’ showing value for money and comparative advantage for UN system and/or Cosponsors;
    - demonstrating priorities for different funding levels.

## Recommendation 2:

**Strategic Recommendation** - Revise the UBRAF Theory of Change (ToC) and modify the associated results framework and M&E systems accordingly to better capture the contribution of the Joint Programme to global and country-level outcomes

- The UBRAF has potential to play a continued useful role as an instrument for the Joint Programme. However, for this to be the case the UBRAF needs to have a fully articulated Theory of Change (ToC) which is fully aligned with a modified results framework that includes precise output level performance indicators which are attributable to the UN system.
- UNAIDS Secretariat to revise the UBRAF Theory of Change (ToC) and results framework (for example as proposed below – see also Annex M). A revised ToC and result framework should:
  - Include Joint Programme outputs (i.e. attributable results of Joint Programme activities) which are currently missing, reflecting the ‘upstream’ functions of the UN;
  - Include Joint Programme outcomes and impacts (i.e. country-level changes that the Joint Programme outputs contribute to, but that are usually a result of the efforts of multiple actors).
- UNAIDS Secretariat to commission regular (preferably bi-annual) external evaluations that would aim to establish links between the UBRAF outputs and country-level outcomes, and validate the contribution implied by the ToC.

# Revised ToC framework with Joint Programme outputs and outcomes specified





# Recommendation 3:

## Strategic Recommendation - Address head-on the future architecture of the Joint Programme

- UNAIDS Senior Management to get on the ‘front foot’ of discussions about the UNAIDS Secretariat’s immediate role and especially long-term (post 2030) role, and to commission a comprehensive external review of strategic options.
- This review should build on the 2017 Global Review Panel and ensure the continued relevance of the Joint Programme as key part of the global HIV response explore options for the future architecture and operation of the Joint Programme, such as:
  - leveraging UN reforms – especially with respect to (a) transparency and simplification of planning, (b) improving financial allocation and reporting, (c) placing greater emphasis on instruments such as UNSDCF, and (d) the possibility of the UNAIDS country-level coordination function to be taken up as part of the UN Resident Coordinators Office – arguably this would also be more in line with the integrated and multi-sectoral approach to sustainable development promoted by the SDGs);
  - radical architecture options such as greatly reducing the size and function of the Secretariat (particularly the Geneva HQ) so that it only has a coordination and strategic information function;
  - increasing the agility of the Joint Programme, for example a more fluid and dynamic process for Cosponsors to join or leave the Joint Programme, and increasing the ability of resources to be reallocated quickly across Cosponsors or geographies to maximise results;
  - leveraging synergies between the big players in the HIV response such as Global Fund and PEPFAR to maximise impact and reduce overlap and inefficiencies.

# Recommendation 4:

## Strategic Recommendation -The Joint Programme should invest more in working better together

- UNAIDS Leadership to hold the CCO responsible for addressing management and resource issues, so that Cosponsor technical experts can collaborate more effectively on programmatic issues. The CCO needs to:
  - strengthen the agency of technical staff to collaboratively implement the Joint Programme as a powerful basis for ongoing future work to combat HIV; and
  - separate conversations around management issues (around process, governance and resources) from the technical and programmatic issues, with an emphasis on ensuring that the former does not crowd out the latter.
- UNAIDS Secretariat to create more platforms and opportunities for Joint Programme technical experts and professionals at all levels to collaborate around key technical and programmatic issues and challenges, such as:
  - technical gatherings/meetings for Joint Programme counterparts to discuss technical issues, best practices, and lessons learned;
  - setting up of a short-term secondment system so that staff can learn more about counterpart programming;
  - joint planning at all levels (country/regional/global).

# Recommendation 5:

**Operational Recommendation** - UNAIDS Secretariat to develop a Joint Programme resource mobilisation strategy that is linked directly to the UN System Strategy and Unified Budget mentioned in Recommendation #1

- UNAIDS Secretariat to conduct a systematic resource mobilisation review for the Joint Programme. This review should cover:
  - three main perspectives: (1) the relative ability of the Secretariat vis-à-vis Cosponsors to raise funds; (2) the resource mobilisation options from a global, regional and country perspective, and (3) an assessment of why the previous UNAIDS resource mobilisation strategy was unsuccessful;
  - an assessment of the donor and member states' likely ongoing support for a special UN programme on HIV, seeking indications from these constituencies on the specific areas that are perceived to be needed/add value, indicating options for the future architecture of the UN response on HIV (see Recommendation #3).
- The results of this review should inform a revised Joint Programme resource mobilisation strategy which is agreed on and owned across the Joint Programme.

# Recommendation 6:

## Operational Recommendation -The Joint Programme needs to sharpen – and possibly overhaul – its resource allocation processes

- UNAIDS Secretariat to solicit independent advice (for the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB)) for a resource allocation process for UNAIDS core funding in the next Unified Budget, in order to restore the collective belief in the validity of the process, improve efficiency and improve transparency for fundraising. This independent review should propose the following:
  - documented rationale and accountability process for resource allocation across the Joint Programme;
  - criteria to allocate core funds to Cosponsors, e.g. contribution to UN System Strategy priorities, resource needs and fundraising abilities;
  - criteria to allocate core funds to programme activities, e.g. contribution to UN System Strategy priorities, joint versus individual Cosponsor activities, priority countries;
  - an arbitrated resource allocation process;
  - an exit strategy for Cosponsors to graduate out of core funding support if they have enough resources, and strategy for UN agencies to 'buy into' UNAIDS services.
- UNAIDS Secretariat to commission a detailed assessment/evaluation of the country envelope mechanism.
- UNAIDS Secretariat to commission an independent review of the human resource levels of the UNAIDS Secretariat vis-à-vis UN System Strategy priorities (see also Recommendation #8). This review should assess:
  - economies of arrangements within countries and regions;
  - appropriateness of human resources of the UNAIDS Secretariat at global, regional and country level;
  - options for arrangements to allocate staff across agencies depending on requirements, the presence of agencies and programmes.

# Recommendation 7:

**Operational Recommendation** - The Joint Programme should develop a concise and clear Joint UN 'HIV and gender' plan to facilitate the implementation of strategic gender commitments

- UNAIDS Secretariat to mainstream gender commitments into the upcoming Strategy, by developing an accompanying Joint UN 'HIV and gender' plan (annexed or standalone) that provides guidance for the Joint Programme on practical implementation of the commitments. This process should ensure that the Joint UN 'HIV and gender' plan:
  - Articulates a shared understanding of the gender aspects of the HIV epidemic, definitions, scope and principles;
  - Allocates roles and responsibilities to action areas among Cosponsors and Secretariat
  - Is informed by a review of evidence that demonstrates where strategic gender commitments resulted in positive HIV response outcomes the national level
  - Reflects existing gender mainstreaming strategies, approaches and best practice articulated across the UN system and elsewhere;
- UNAIDS Secretariat to incorporate the above into the UN System Strategy and Unified Budget described in Recommendation #1.

# Recommendation 8:

## Operational Recommendation - Act now to maintain HIV technical expertise in Joint Programme Response

- UNAIDS Secretariat to undertake a review of the human resource levels of the Cosponsor HIV departments vis-à-vis UN System Strategy priorities (see also Recommendation #6). This review should:
  - address the need to maintain HIV technical leadership across the Joint Programme.
  - examine to what extent HIV specialist expertise (e.g. in relation to working on issues around Key Populations and policy work) is being adequately resourced.
  - help bolster focused Cosponsor technical HIV expertise (mainly but not only at country level) so that quality programming is assured.
- UNAIDS Secretariat to support Cosponsors to advocate for adequate human resources with the PCB and donors, and the financial resource for this.

# Thank you

For follow up please contact

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